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Some Short-run Macroeconomic Considerations





COVID-19 constitutes a health crisis which has rapidly turned into a
social and economic crisis. This paper briefly explores some of the issues
raised by the combination of a massive supply-side shock with a mas-
sive demand-side shock, and the interaction of these with the exponential
dynamics of a viral infection.
The analysis suggests that, during the recovery, the state of infection
among the existing workforce relative to that of the incoming one will
play an important role in determining the dynamic interactions between
economics and epidemiology. Perhaps counterintuitively, the logic of the
basic epidemiological SI model suggests that, under plausible assumptions
about consumer behavior, steady recovery is helped if the re-hired workers
are more heavily infected than the existing workforce. This has implica-
tions for the fiscal strategies that are likely to be pursued in the coming
months. In particular, fiscal instruments should simultaneously target
aggregate demand and disease transmissibility in relatively small steps.
There is no restoring economic health without stabilizing economic
sentiments, the path to which goes through communicating a reasonable
degree of control over pathogen spread.
JEL classifications: E62, H51, E60.
Key words: Epidemiological models, COVID-19, aggregate demand, ag-
gregate supply, fiscal policy.
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Some Short-run Macroeconomic Considerations
as Society Deals with a Once-in-Generations
Pandemic
1 Motivation
The shock represented by COVID-19 appears to have been unexpected, not
in a black swan sense — something like this was likely to happen sooner or
later if books by leading epidemiologists and Hollywood blockbusters are to
be believed —but rather in the sense that it has forced multitudes to rapidly
upgrade their understanding of counter-intuitive concepts such as exponential
growth and externalities. Perhaps we may even need to refashion Dornbusch
and recognize that, sometimes in economics, things emerge quicker than one
thinks they will, and then they evolve even faster than one thought they could.
This paper extends a simple existing epidemiological model of infectious
diseases to incorporate economic interactions in a way that I think helps shed
light on some ongoing concerns. Consider some salient aspects that make this
public health crises unique from an economic perspective:
1. The economic shocks are simultaneously both supply-side and demand-
side in nature. Government-mandated isolation and fear have forced
large-scale layoffs while at the same time scaring the public into spending
less, especially on services.
2. The supply side constraint is likely to relax faster, as long as the sup-
ply infrastructure such as employee skills, employment networks, physical
capital continue to exist, so that parts of these can be re-activated in
line with relaxed public health regulations. Private demand, however,
will probably recover more gradually, as a nervous public slowly begins to
gain confidence.
3. We are likely to experience the pandemic in waves without the protection
of a vaccine over the coming months. It is hard to mandate strict social
isolation, especially in a democracy that banks heavily on social trust.
When and where mandates are prematurely relaxed, the problem is likely
to re-emerge. An ongoing game of whack-a-mole is unfortunately not hard
to foresee across states, regions, and countries.
4. As in a broaching sailboat, expectations are likely to be unhinged from
fundamentals in the short term. This means that goods and asset prices
are not particularly good signals to follow in the near future. A further
implication is that rather than assuming backward-looking adaptive be-
havior or forward-looking rational behavior, it may make sense to expect
“animal spirits” and the current state of disease spread to play a major
role in guiding actions of economic agents.
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5. With the economy already flirting with the zero lower bound at the begin-
ning of the pandemic, monetary policy is largely restricted to lowering the
perception of risk, easing liquidity, and attempting to provide a reassuring
floor under asset prices.
6. Inflation is likely to appear in some sectors as bottlenecks emerge.1 How-
ever, despite the supply-side shock, economy-wide inflation does not ap-
pear to pose a threat in the near future.
7. A policy of rapidly getting people back to work, even if successful on its
own terms, could end up creating bigger problems. Increased interactions
between healthy and (often asymptomatic or presymptomatic) infected
people is a recipe for endogenously generating viral and economic waves.
Taken together, the first 6 features create a formidably strong case for un-
precedented fiscal policy action. Such policy must not only seek to provide a
floor to incomes but also try to maintain employment infrastructure for the near
future. Feature (7) points to a different kind of challenge. As long as we lack
a vaccine and/or other effective antiviral interventions, successful fiscal policy
may sow the seeds for further waves. The oft-repeated mantra of testing, trac-
ing, and isolating is, therefore, as important from a public health perspective
as it is for the success of policy action in the economic domain. Not much less
important may be the composition of the workforce that gets re-hired as the
economy recovers relative to that of the part of the workforce that remained
undisturbed by the crisis. This is the message that the remainder of this paper
underlines.
The analysis here has some interesting implications. In the simplest set-
up that ignores the endogeneity of private spending sentiment, fiscal policy is
effective over time in achieving any employment target it sets for itself without
increasing the prevalence of the infection as a proportion of the workforce in the
steady state. This changes once consumer sentiment is plausibly assumed to
vary with the state of the infection among the worker force. The introduction
of such variation introduces volatility and cycles of infection and employment,
and make it harder, and even impossible, for policy makers to ensure a smooth
transition to higher employment. Perhaps counter-intuitively, this result only
holds when the prevalence of infection is lower among the incoming workers
compared to the existing workforce. Put simply, this is because new employment
in this case generates disproportionately more targets for each infected person.
The underlying message is reminiscent of the Tinbergen rule. To highlight this
aspect, and better match the policy experiment to currently ongoing events, I
consider the case where policy makers have an explicit employment ceiling that
they set to avoid re-emergence of a viral wave. Policy makers, therefore, have
two targets: (1) stabilizing the state of infection spread, and (2) the level of
employment. Achievement of the two targets will in general require another
1This may be one historical instance where the Fed printing lots of (toilet) paper as legal
tender may actually help prevent inflation.
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policy instrument in addition to government spending. An expanded regime of
testing and contact tracing that lowers the transmissibility of the infection at
work could constitute the second instrument.
The analysis proceeds, roughly in increasing level of complexity, as follows.
Section 2 develops the basic model where employment is purely demand-led,
policy places no upper constraints on how many sectors can re-open starting with
a post-initial shock equilibrium, and consumer spending sentiment is not affected
by the state of the infection. Section 3 extends the basic model to include
endogenous consumer sentiments or animal spirits. Section 4 then incorporates
an important aspect of the current situation by allowing policy to set constraints
on employment by deciding which sectors can re-open. Thought experiments
are developed along the way to explore the effects of various policy-directed
and non-policy developments. Section 5 revisits the highlights with concluding
thoughts.
2 Incorporating Macroeconomic Considerations
in Simple Epidemiological Models of Infection
There are several things to keep in mind as the economy recovers from the first
wave of the pandemic: (1) policy help will be required on the demand side to
restore normal patterns of employment and spending, and (2) in the absence
of a vaccine or effective antiviral treatments, the chance of a second wave will
increase as these normal patterns are restored.
Start with a continuous version of the simple SI (susceptible-infected) model
from epidemiology.2 Consider a population of N employed workers, S of whom
are currently susceptible to disease, while I are currently infected. There is
homogeneous mixing of susceptible and infected individuals in the workforce.
Each infected person has χ contacts with other individuals so that χS/N of
these interactions are with susceptible persons. If the fraction of these contacts
resulting in infection is denoted by τ , then each infected person infects χτS/N
susceptible individuals. I will use β (= χτ) to represent the transmissibility of
the disease. Of the infected individuals, a proportion γ recover each period and
re-enter the pool of susceptible workers. The expression β/γ then defines the
widely-used basic reproductive number R0, which essentially equals the effective
reproductive number Re as long as the share of infected persons is relatively
small.3 Note that, given exponential growth, 1/β gives the mean duration of
the infection.
2See, for example, Hethcote (2000).
3This number can be interpreted as the tipping point for infection spreading. A value of Ro
less (more) than one implies that each person infects fewer (more) than one other individuals.
The former implies that the disease is on course to die out. While robust estimates are yet
to be established, Anderson et al. (2020) estimated the Ro for SARS-Cov-2 to be 2 — 2.5 in
the early phase in China, although other studies have suggested higher numbers. By way
of comparison, Biggerstaff et al. (2014) estimated the median Ro for the Spanish influenza
pandemic in 1918 to be 1.8.
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In each period, as new workers enter the workforce, a fraction α of them are
susceptible while the rest are infected (the same is true for workers who leave the
workforce). This parameter will play an influential role in driving interactions
between the virus and the economy and in highlighting the importance of testing.
Let’s employ the boiled down version that incorporates non-linear interac-
tions between S and I without births and deaths.
Ṡ = −βSI
N




− γI + (1− α)Ṅ (2)
The assumption that workers become susceptible after recovery is important
and deserves some attention. One could easily relax this assumption and work
with a SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model instead. While it is likely,
given past experience with SARS-Covid viruses, that recovered people will de-
velop antibodies that give immunity, at least for a few weeks, the weight of the
evidence is far from clear at this point.4 Moreover, given the short-run focus of
the analysis here, the proportion of the population that has recovered in these
initial stages is likely to be low enough so that this simplification comes at a
low cost.
The set-up up until this point is the standard SI one, with the exception of
the rightmost terms in eqs. (1) and (2). With society largely socially quaranti-
ned, the bulk of the new cases are likely to originate from at-work interactions.
This makes policy especially tricky in a rapidly shrinking economy since mea-
sures taken to restore employment will also increase the odds of interaction.
Let’s now introduce macroeconomic considerations by incorporating the goods
market.
The focus here is on the short run. The economy retains its capital and
infrastructure, capacity utilization is low, and the constraint on output is labor.
It makes sense to ignore investment, technological change, and open economy
issues for the purpose of the present analysis. With labor productivity nor-
malized to unity, output (Y ) at any given instant corresponds with employment
(N).
Y = N (3)
Policy regulates the nature and volume of businesses that can remain open.
Later in Section 4, I will model the supply side shock as a variation in the
maximum level of employment (and hence output) allowed, Nmax. The actual
level of output is demand-determined in a Keynesian sense. One would ex-
pect actual output to change gradually in response to changes in regulation as
4The epidemiology of other coronaviruses such as SARS-CoV1 and MERS-CoV appear to
be substantially different, and are therefore limited in their ability to help establish what to
expect from the current pathogen.
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consumer sentiment evolves and employment networks are re-established. The
adjustment of output is specified here as a partial lag adjustment, with gaps in
demand (the sum of the levels of autonomous consumption, c0 + c1Y and gov-
ernment spending g, where c1 < 1 in line with the standard Keynesian setup)
and actual output driving the dynamics at a speed denoted by η.
Ṅ = η [c0 + g − (1− c1)N ] (4)
It would make life easier for later analysis if we normalize S and I by the
size of the workforce, s ≡ S/N and i ≡ I/N , so that the respective equations of
motion become:
ṡ = (γ − βs)(1− s) + η(α− s) [c0 + g − (1− c1)N ] (5)
i̇ = −(γ − βs)i+ η(1− α− i) [c0 + g − (1− c1)N ] (6)
where I have used the property that s + i = 1 . Given that the two variables
i and s are not independent at any given point in time, either of these two
equations along with equation (4) constitutes our dynamic system. I will use
equations (4) and (5).
Equations (5) and (6) involve two strong assumptions that are worth some
discussion. The fact that α is being assumed constant means that the rate of
infection outside the employed workforce has settled at a stable level. As long
as society practices social isolation for long enough so that the transmission rate
within households is low, this is not a dramatic assumption (think of β being
very low within households). A second assumption is that the proportion of the
workforce exiting employment is infected to the same extent as the proportion
of the individuals re-entering employment. This is a rather strong assumption,
especially since the exiting workforce would have been exposed to the virus
during employment. The proportion of susceptible workers among the exiting
population, in other words, should be a weighted average of α and s. Relaxing
this assumption would require a significant increase in the complexity of the
specification without much gain in insight, since the results would hold as long
as the weighted average is different from s in the same direction as α.5













A non-negative number of infected individuals requires that the rate of re-
covery γ from infection be less than its transmissibility β. The effective repro-
duction number, in other words, needs to be greater than 1. This is a well-known
result from standard epidemiological models; as mentioned earlier, a value equal
to or less than 1 leads to disappearance of the disease.
5Put differently, if α > s, then δα+ (1− δ)s > s holds, where δ ∈ [0, 1] and 1− δ are the
respective weights assigned as new workers enter or old workers exit employment.
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With this simple set-up, it is easy to show that the system is locally stable
around the non-trivial steady state. Once displaced, the adjustment could be
monotonic or in the nature of half cycles.6 The transitional dynamics, however,
depend on whether or not the proportion of new workers that is infected, i.e.,
1 − α, is greater than the initial (steady state) proportion of infected workers,
i.e., 1 − α ≶ i. The intuition is quite straightforward and is perhaps best
illustrated with the help of a few thought experiments. Suffi ce it to say at this
point that, as shown in Figure 1, the Ṅ = 0 isocline is horizontal in s − N
space since aggregate demand is independent of the proportion of susceptibles
in the neighborhood of the steady state, while the slope of the ṡ = 0 depends on
whether 1−α ≶ i. It is upward-sloping when 1−α > i, i.e., when the proportion
of incoming workers that is infected is higher than that in the already employed
workforce. To understand why, notice that an increase in N creates excess
supply in the goods market and leads to declining employment as firms cut
output in response. Since the proportion workers leaving is tilted in this case
towards infected individuals, lower employment has to be offset by a higher level
of susceptible individuals along the ṡ = 0 isocline.
It is also worth noting that the link between the goods market and the
state of infection runs through, (i) changes in employment, i.e., Ṅ ≷ 0, and (ii)
differences in the composition of the existing and entering/exiting work force,
i.e., α ≷ s. Subsequent analysis crucially centers around these links.
Finally, notice that the government has one policy instrument, i.e., fiscal
policy (the level of G). Although there is no specific employment target at this
point, such an objective will be introduced later.
Fiscal Expansion
Starting with this simple set-up where there are no policy-induced caps on
employment, let’s consider the effects of an increase in government spending in
order to help generate demand and employment. Since firms can hire freely
in response to demand, employment picks up through the Keynesian multiplier
process. The two isoclines shift up (see the dotted lines in Figure 1). However,
the steady state level of per capita infection is unchanged. The transitional
dynamics depend on the composition of the incoming workforce. If the incoming
proportion of infected individuals is higher, as shown in the left panel of Figure 1,
then, not surprisingly, the proportion of infected individuals in the population
initially increases. As the infected individuals recover over time, the initial
proportions of the two groups in the population are restored. A similar story
plays out when the incoming proportion of infected workers is less than that
in the existing workforce, although now the transitional dynamics involve an
initial decline in the share of the infected population before it rises back to its
original value as interactions increase.
In both cases, the steady state level of employment is higher (N1 > N0),
although the steady state proportions of the two populations are unchanged.
This result is not surprising in light of equation (7). Given that the proportions
6 In the latter case, both real roots are negative.
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haven’t changed while employment is higher, the absolute number of both the
susceptible and infected individuals must be higher.
Social Quarantining
The aim of public health measures is ultimately to bring the effective re-
productive number Re down to manageable levels. Suppose health offi cials and
politicians have managed to lower β through social isolation. Suppose next
that the restoration of some employment networks raises this number again.7
A quick look at the steady state solutions, as given by equation (7), tells us
that the expanded workforce will include a greater proportion of infected indi-
viduals. This is true regardless of the existing workforce relative to the outside
population! Why? Notice that since demand is unchanged, so is the level of
employment. Greater interactions among the workforce mean a greater preva-
lence of virus hosts, regardless of the level of employment.
The ṡ = 0 isocline shifts up, as shown in Figure 2, while the other isocline
is unmoved. The movement of s is along the horizontal isocline.
Effective Testing to Filter New Workers
Suppose that, with high specificity tests,8 firms are able to lower the propor-
tion of infected workers among those recalled to work (i.e., increase α). Again,
since aggregate demand is unchanged, the steady state level of employment is
unchanged. It follows trivially from the fact that there are no transitional
dynamics —neither of the isoclines shifts — that the steady state composition
7Since higher employment would be expected to increase interactions at given levels of
s and i, it would be more plausible to endogenize β and make it a function of the level of
employment. I address this issue later.
8The term specificity refers to the percentage of those who do have not been infected and
test negative.
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Figure 2: The effects of social quarantining when: (i) 1 − α > γβ (left hand
panel), (ii) 1− α < γβ (right hand panel).
of the work force too remains unchanged. Changes in the composition of the
incoming work force between the susceptibles and the infected matters only if
new employment is generated.
The emphasis in this section so far has been on the role offi cially-driven
demand in determining the level of employment and thus the steady state pro-
portion of susceptible and infected workers in the employed pool. Like Janus,
fiscal policy makers manage to transition between lower and higher employ-
ment states that coincide with whatever level of infection is acceptable among
the work force. The next section will relax this strong assumption. Before we
get there, however, let’s consider one more thought experiment.
Endogenizing the Basic Reproductive Number
Since higher employment would be expected to increase interactions at given
levels of s and i, it would be more plausible to endogenize β and make it a
function of the level of employment.9 Such a change will not affect the analysis
here in any qualitative sense, although the ṡ = 0 will then be more likely to
have a negative slope. Put differently, this isocline could have a negative slope
even if initially 1−α < γβ . An implication for fiscal policy is that the trade-off
between employment and infection control is now less friendly since the resulting
steady state level of share of infected workers will be higher per unit of fiscal
stimulus. Even an omnipotent fiscal policy maker faces constraints on action
in the middle of a virus-induced pandemic!
Things get more complicated once fiscal omniscience is dented by expecta-
tions and sentiments. In particular, the ability to reliably achieve any desired
9This could be due to, for example, greater use of public transportation, more shared use
of offi ce equipment, and more face-to-face meetings that increase the transmissibility of the
disease as employment rises.
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rate of employment at a given level of infection spread is compromised.
3 The Prevalence of Infection Influences Con-
sumer Sentiment
One would plausibly assume consumer (and investment) sentiment to depend on
the state of viral spread. Consumers experiencing infection in their neighbor-
hoods will grow warier about the future and animal spirits will dampen. Let’s
next incorporate this aspect by making autonomous consumption a function
of the proportion of infected individuals in the work force, so that c0 = c0(i),
where c′0 < 0.
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Although the solutions for the steady state levels from the previous section
are qualitatively unchanged, the system may could now yield instability in a
local sense (i.e., the trace of the Jacobian of endogenous variables now has an
ambiguous sign). A suffi cient (but not necessary) condition for stability is
that the proportion of incoming workers that is infected be greater than the
corresponding proportion for the existing work force, i.e., 1 − α > i.11 A
necessary (but not suffi cient) condition for destabilizing dynamics to occur is
that the reverse be true, i.e., 1− α < i.12
PROOFS IN APPENDIX
Let’s start with the major change, as illustrated by Figure 3. The crucial
difference from the earlier figures is that the Ṅ = 0 isocline is now upward-
sloping. Why? Because consumer sentiment and hence aggregate demand is no
longer independent of the prevalence of infection. A higher level of employment,
that generates greater interactions and infection spread among the workforce
now affects the state of animal spirits. Thus elevated employment is consistent
with equilibrium in the goods market only at lower proportions of infection
(higher s).
How does this change modify our thinking about fiscal policy? Consider
first the stable case. Call this Case 1 which is represented by the top left
10One may argue that it is the state of infection in the entire population rather than in
the workforce that would affect consumer expectations. While this is a fair comment, the
simplification here can be defended on the grounds that it is probably the prevalence of the
infection in the working age population —which is normally the most economically active —
that is likely to matter the most for expectations about the economic future.
11Recall that, in earlier sections, this condition defined the trajectories of transitional dy-
namics but not the stability properties of the steady state.










Note that the greater the transmissibility of the disease and the lower the goods market
multiplier, the responsiveness of consumer sentiment, or the speed of adjustment in the goods
market, the more likely it is for this condition to be satisfied.
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hand panel in Figure 3. As in our previous analysis, the steady state level of
employment is higher while the steady state proportions of the susceptible and
infected proportions are unchanged following a fiscal expansion. A look at the
figure should convince the reader that the trajectory will be a clockwise half-
cycle with the two variables initially moving in opposite directions and then in
the same direction. The semi-cyclical behavior is being directed by volatility
in consumer sentiment as the virus expands or contracts among the workforce
in waves. Initially, increased government spending creates excess demand in
the goods market. As employment expands, the greater proportion of infected
among the incoming workforce means that the proportion of susceptibles ini-
tially declines. This lowers animal spirits over time and consumption declines.
Eventually, the number of targets for the infection are low enough so that the
population of susceptibles begins to recover. As this happens employment rises,
now aided by consumer sentiment, to the new steady state where the composi-
tion of the population is back to its original proportions.
At the end of the day the system approaches the steady state with fiscal
policy having achieved the desired aim of higher employment without a change
in the infected proportion of the workforce (although the absolute number of
infected workers has increased). Higher employment has not come at the expense
of compromising on the rate of infection.
Is fiscal policy still successful on these terms if 1−α < i, that is, the fraction
of new workers that is infected is lower than that for the existing workers?
Unlike all the analysis leading up to this point, the answer is no, if consumer
sentiment is adequately sensitive to the state of the infection. To directly analyze
the contrast, let’s consider Case (3) where the behavior of spending sentiment is
sensitive enough as to cause instability. This case is captured by the lower panel
of Figure 3. While there is an intermediate case, i.e., Case 2 (represented by the
top right panel of Figure 3), I will refer to this case only briefly for comparison
purposes.










> 1− α (8)
In words, the proportion of new workers that is infected coming in should
be lower than the same proportion of the existing work force by an amount
defined by term in between the two inequality signs. Notice that this term
depends, among other factors, on the responsiveness of consumer sentiment.
In terms of Figure 3, the high sensitivity of consumer sentiment to the state
of infection makes the Ṅ = 0 isocline steeper. In this case, we get expanding
counter-clockwise cycles and instability.
To understand why, let’s consider the consequences of fiscal policy, starting
with the initial impact which creates excess demand in the goods market. Since
the resulting rise in employment involves, unlike the earlier case, an incoming
work force that is less heavily infected, s initially rises, generating a counter-
clockwise movement involving an increase in bothN and s. As output increases,
10









> 1 − α
(bottom panel).
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it is further bolstered by the fact that the proportion of infected workers is
falling, boosting animal spirits. This virtuous process comes to an end at point
A, however, when the level of s attains a high enough value that the rate of
infection spread due to increased worker interactions significantly exceeds the
rate of recovery among the infected. Beyond this point, the number of infections
starts rising again, starting a new wave of disease spread even as employment
continues to rise. Declining animal spirits and consumer spending now act as a
drag on employment generation, until we reach point B, where the initial fiscal
stimulus has been neutralized, Ṅ = 0, while the infection is still spreading.
Beyond this point, the initial impetus to employment provided by the fiscal
stimulus has been more than offset. Now employment is declining while the
proportion of infected individuals is increasing (i.e., N and s are moving in
the same direction). Once a suffi cient number of susceptible individuals have
left the work force, we are at a point like C, where ṡ = 0.13 Beyond C,
the proportion of susceptibles starts recovering due to much fewer interactions,
and this eventually restores consumer confidence over time until we reach D,
and spending and employment start another upward trajectory along with the
number of susceptibles, thanks to the healthier composition of the new workers.
In sum, we see counter-clockwise cycles and waves of infection among the work
force.
The same kind of countercyclical cycle emerges in case 2 (represented by the
top right hand panel in Figure 3), which is, however, distinguished from case 3
by the fact that the cycles shrink and lead back to the steady state over time.












The goods market multiplier (1/(1 − c1)) and sensitivity of spending to the
state of the infection turn out to be a crucial factor. The more responsive the
sentiment, the greater the likelihood of explosive cycles and repeating waves of
infection.
Why does spending sentiment play such a decisive role in the course of the
response? Why is high sensitivity such a crucial factor? A fiscal expansion
increases employment and interactions. If the incoming workforce is less in-
fected, this creates more targets for the infection just as consumer sentiment is
rebounding. If this latter rebound is strong enough, the initial impact of the fis-
cal action is magnified, which then allows for a bigger resurgence of infections.
The lack of consumer sensitivity, or the complete absence of it, on the other
hand, dampen these exploding interactions between infection and employment.
How would one want to address the volatility in this situation? Since policy
makers do not have an employment ceiling to target, one option for them is to
choose the highest point in the first cycle, i.e., the point where employment is at
its peak in that cycle, and then freeze aggregate demand at that point using fiscal
policy. Point B’in Figure 4, which corresponds to point B in Figure 3 represents
13Notice that, at point C, s is still below its initial steady state value β/γ, so that the
first term on the RHS of equation (5) is positive but this is exactly offset by the fact that
employment is falling, so that the second term on the RHS is negative.
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Figure 4: Policy induced control of volatility
such a choice. Even in our simple set-up, this poses a challenge. At B’, the
prevalence of infection is lower than that in the steady state (which recall is
unchanged from its original level). The high number of susceptibles should cause
infection spread. With the level of employment frozen, the only way to avoid
this would be to take actions that shift the ṡ = 0 isocline up so that it passes
through B’. This, in turn, requires epidemiological interventions that lower the
β/γ ratio, i.e., actions such as testing, medical interventions, and re-designing
of work spaces that accelerate recovery and reduce the transmissibility and
duration of infection. This scenario takes us to a higher employment level with
a lower prevalence of infection in the workforce without intermediate volatility.
Two goals, as Tinbergen reminds us, require two instruments. The second
instrument here has been the use of public health measures to stabilize the
reproductive number. The main lesson is that fiscal policy will have to be
two-pronged, with spending directed both at demand recovery and at health
measures to achieve higher employment at stable levels of infection.
MATH IN APPENDIX
I have assumed here that the fiscal expansion is a one-time level change.
Of course, however, the policy makers may in the middle of a pandemic place
constraints on how much employment is allowed to open up at a given stage of
the recovery, regardless of the level of aggregate demand. Also, they may under
the circumstances, respond aggressively to negative consumer sentiment. The
next section addresses these issues.
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4 The SI Model with Policy-Induced Employ-
ment Constraints
As mentioned earlier, the COVID19 pandemic has simultaneously generated
supply- and demand-side shocks, and policy must address both. On the supply
side, offi cially sanctioned/enforced/encouraged social quarantining has forced
companies to radically cut employment at the same time that dramatically
pessimistic animal spirits and imminent job losses have led people to cut ex-
penditures. The analysis in the previous sections has assumed the absence of
supply-side constraints on employment. This is unrealistic in the midst of an
ongoing response to a pandemic.
To introduce a supply-side constraint, let’s assume that the government
places a cap on the nature and number of establishments that can be re-opened
for business. While in reality the caps may vary by sector, I simplify by sup-
posing an aggregate ceiling on employment, Nmax. One can think of this as
regulations that, for example, limit how many persons can work or be served
in a building in order to maintain a safe distance between them. Actual em-
ployment would be expected to react gradually to regulations as firms slowly
feel their way towards hiring more workers in response to excess demand. In
the meantime, fiscal policy responds to any gap between the mandated maxi-
mum employment and actual employment. This expanded system can now be
captured by three equations of motion.14
ṡ = (γ − βs)(1− s) + η(α− s) [c0 + g − (1− c1)N ] (9)
Ṅ = η [c0 + g − (1− c1)N ] (10)
ġ = φ (Nmax −N) (11)
As before, there is one non-trivial steady state, given by:













Adding an extra dimension to a dynamic system, as we have done here, ren-
ders the workings of the system harder to explain in intuitive terms. However,
the system here is simple enough for us to refer back to the intuition devel-
oped earlier. In particular, notice that the steady state expressions for the
state variables from the earlier sections are unchanged. That for government
spending is the value that matches employment to its mandated level. Notice
also that equation (10) is independent of s, as is equation (11), which in ad-
dition is also independent of g. The latter equation determines the value of
government spending commensurate with the gap between actual employment
14Lurking in the background again is a fourth equation, that for the evolution of i, but it
is superfluous as before.
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and its mandated level at any instant. The first two dynamic equations then
determine changes in the level of (demand-led) employment and the fraction
of infected individuals. This decoupling of the new equation of motion means
that the system has very similar properties to the earlier one. In particular,
once fiscal policy has chosen the level of government spending that yields the
targeted level of employment, it can be made consistent with any level of s.15
Without going into too much detail, the trace and determinant of the Ja-
cobian of endogenous variables are negative, and the Routh-Hurwitz conditions
for a 3 × 3 system are unambiguously satisfied. As long as nothing changes
the reproductive number, fiscal policy can reliably achieve any chosen rate of
employment at a given rate of infection.
[Proof in the Appendix]
Reintroducing the Volatility of Consumer Sentiment
If, as earlier, we think about how spending sentiment may respond to the
state of infection spread, then things become more complicated and policy mak-
ers may not be able to achieve their objectives. As it turns out, the stability
conditions are exactly the same as under similar conditions without the supply-
side constraint (see Section 3). The prevalence of infection in the existing
workforce relative to that among entering workers remains the decisive factor
along with the responsiveness of consumer sentiment.
As before, an interesting case again is when a greater proportion of incom-
ing workers is infected than the existing work force, and consumer sentiment
responds strongly to conditions. Under these conditions, the system could be
unstable. Barring good luck or a drop in community transmission, employment
and infection interact in waves. Good luck here, perhaps ironically, consists
of the incoming work force being more infected than the existing workforce, so
that there are fewer targets for infection as employment grows.
Suppose that we are in the unstable case, where the prevalence of infec-
tion is lower among incoming workers (see Figure 5), and which coincides with
the lower panel in Figure 3. Suppose further that policy makers, in order to
avoid volatility, set the ceiling at point Nmax, which coincides with the level of
employment where the two isoclines intersect.16 Employment runs into this
ceiling at a point like A”, where Ġ = 0 but employment and the proportion
of susceptibles is still growing. Fiscal policy has attained its target but unless
other policy instruments are available, the rate of infection has not stabilized,
and excess demand pressures remain in the goods market. The state of supply
is not commensurate with the animal spirits that remain positive in light of
declining infection prevalence.
Alternatively, to remove these pressures, policy makers could set the ceiling,
Nmax 2, at point B”, which coincides with point B in Figure 3 and point B’in
Figure 4. At this point, employment and government spending have stabilized
15Again, this will change once consumer sentiment is endogenized.
16Since we are now discussing a 3× 3 system, the isoclines and the ceiling should be inter-
preted as planes or surfaces rather than lines.
15
but the level of infection is still in flux. The addition of a policy goal, i.e.,
controlling volatility, without the addition of a policy instrument has again left
policy makers one instrument short. A public health instrument that changes
the reproductive number and shifts the ṡ = 0 isocline up is needed.
What if this ceiling is set too high, say above Nmax 2? Such an ambitious
employment target will set into motion cycles of employment and infection.
Contrary to an oft-repeated proverb, it is desirable to cross the chasm between
full and current employment in small steps.
Figure 5: Policy sets a ceiling on employment
5 (Preliminary) Concluding Thoughts
This paper has extended a simple model from epidemiology to analyze the in-
teraction of economic policy, infection spread, and consumer sentiments. In the
simplest set-up fiscal action is helpful in boosting employment at a given level
of infection spread, and the only constraint is the size of the multiplier. In-
corporation of complications such as the endogeneity of the basic reproductive
number places limits on success that depend on the composition of the incoming
workforce. While this underlines the importance of testing, employment ob-
jectives are still achievable. Incorporation of consumer sentiments and animal
spirits eliminate guaranteed success, and the magnitude of these factors becomes
crucial alongside the state of infection among the existing and entering/exiting
workforce in determining the interplay of disease and employment. A corner
solution with matters spiraling out of hand becomes a possibility in the case
where recovery of employment and a fall in infection rates among the workforce
generates excessive consumer optimism. Policy makers may place limits on the
level of employment in any given state of recovery from the pandemic, both in
order to control spread and to manage volatility. The analysis here indicates
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that doing this succesfully while stabilizing virus spread will require adding an-
other weapon to the armory. Tinbergen’s insight remains relevant: the number
of instruments must in general match the number of goals.
A significant amount of recent policy focus has (rightly) been on testing. The
analysis here highlights a related but different dimension. As long as infection
is prevalent among the work force, there is a case for enlarging the fiscal focus
from purely aggregate demand-driven spending towards measures that reduce
the transmissibility of the disease in the workplace. The task of policy is near-
Sisyphean in an ongoing pandemic, and once the drastic step of society-wide
lockdown has been taken, the small steps back to normalcy will have to be
simultaneously epidemiological and economic in nature to match the goals.
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6 Mathematical Appendix
This appendix presents in more detail the mathematical results derived in the
main text.
Section 2
The Jacobian of endogenous variables based on eqs. (4) and (5), and evalu-
ated in the neighborhood of the initial steady state is given by:
J(s̄,N̄) =
[







From which it follows that the determinant is given by, |J| = −η(γ−β)c0 > 0,
and the trace by Tr = γ − 2β − ηc0 < 0.
The condition for both eigenroots to be negative and real, which can be
shown to be:
[γ − 2β + η(1− c1)]2 > 0
is unambiguously satisfied.
The comparative statics for the various thought experiments are as follows










































As a consequence, |J| = −η(γ − β)(1 − c1) > 0, and the trace by Tr =




c′0 ≷ 0. The first two terms in the trace
expression are negative (recall that γ < β from the steady state solution), while
the final term has a positive effect (recall that c′0 < 0) if α > γ/β and a negative
effect otherwise.The 3 different cases considered in the main text canbe derived
directly from the expression for the trace.
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The discriminant, i.e., ∆ = Tr2−4 |J| yields the conditions under which the
sytem yields real or imaginary roots. Since,
















therefore, a suffi cient condition for ∆ > 0 and both eigenvalues to be negative
is that α < γ/β. A necessary condition for imaginary roots, and hence cycles
is that this inequality be reversed. The necessary and suffi cient condition for
explosive cycles (expression (8) in the main text), can be derived from here.












Again, first the case with exogenous consumer sentiments.
J(s̄,N̄) =








0 −η(1− c1)Nmax ηNmax
0 −φ 0

so that |J| = η(γ − β)φNmax < 0 and Tr = (γ − β)− η(1− c1)Nmax < 0.
The Routh-Hurwitz conditions, given by:
− [(γ − β)− η(1− c1)Nmax] > 0
[1− (γ − β)(1− c1)] ηNmax > 0
−(γ − β)ηφNmax > 0{
[1− (γ − β)(1− c1)] ηNmax + (γ − β)2
}
(1− c1)ηNmax > 0
are satisfied unambiguously.
Endogenizing consumer sentiment changes the endogenous variable Jacobian
to:
J(s̄,N̄,ḡ) =












−ηc′0 −η(1− c1)Nmax ηNmax
0 −φ 0






In this case, the Routh-Hurwitz conditions change to:
−
[







[φ− (γ − β)(1− c1)] ηNmax > 0















c′0 − η(1− c1)Nmax
]}
(1−
c1)(γ − β)ηNmax > 0
which yields 3 cases, as captured by expression (8) of the main text.
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